The study of international relations, and political science more broadly, has derived great benefits from the recent growth of social network analysis (SNA). More than just a novel approach to evaluating the old puzzles, SNA provides a whole new way of theoretical thinking. Challenging the traditional dyad-driven approach to the study of IR, SNA highlights actor interdependence that goes beyond dyads and emphasizes that many traditional IR variables, such as conflict, trade, alliances, or international organization memberships must be treated and studied as networks. Properties of these networks (e.g., polarization, density), and of actor positions within them (e.g., similarity, centrality), will then reveal important insights about international events. SNA, however, is not yet fully adapted to account for important methodological issues common to IR research, specifically the issue of endogeneity or possible nonindependence between actors' position within international networks and the outcomes of interest: e.g. alliance network may be nonindependent from the conflict or trade network. We adopt an instrumental variables approach to explore and address the issue of endogeneity in network context. We illustrate the issue and the advantages of our approach with Monte Carlo analysis, as well as with several empirical examples from IR literature.
Introduction
The international relations (IR) literature has long recognized that many of its key variables are relational in nature. Rather than capturing the behavior of a single actor, these variables measure the outcomes of simultaneous interactions among two or more actors. For this reason, IR scholars have shown growing interest in the tools of social network analysis (SNA), which allow researchers to go beyond dyadic-level analysis and recast traditional IR variables -such as conflict, trade, alliances, or IO memberships -as networks connecting international states. Properties of these networks (e.g., density, polarization), and of actor positions within them (e.g., centrality, similarity), may then reveal important insights about international events (e.g., Cranmer, Desmarais and Menninga 2012; Maoz 2010; Maoz et al. 2006; Ward, Hoff and Lofdhall 2003) .
As a result, identifying the relevant properties of international networks and exploring their effects constitutes a large part of SNA research within IR.
1 In particular, IR scholars have long grappled with two concepts: "political affinity" among states and states' power and prestige vis-à-vis other members of the international system. The concept of political affinity, commonly measured as the similarity of states' positions within international networks, is based on the idea that international states may be aligned along a socio-political spectrum that corresponds to their policy positions. More specifically, international states may (explicitly or implicitly) form social groups that correspond to their policy preferences.
As a result, some states exhibit convergence, while others diverge on a host of policy issues (Bearce and Bondanella 2007) . On the economic dimension, for example, some states' interests align more closely to the liberal principles espoused by the US in the 20 th and 21 st centuries, while others engage in protectionism. Similar divisions are observed within the security or other dimensions. This implies that states' preferences on particular issues 1 We use the term network in a general sense here to capture studies and variables that consider relative location in any system, whether explicitly treated as a network or not.
can be used to determine their ideological location on an international policy continuum, similar to how political candidates' ideology is used to determine their position along the liberal-conservative spectrum. Just like candidates' political ideology is crucial for explaining their votes on particular bills, so is "political affinity" for explaining behavior of international states. The most commonly used measure of political affinity-S scores, developed by Signorino and Ritter (2002) -actually predates the growth of SNA within IR. Other more recently developed measures include SEq or structural equivalence scores, introduced by Maoz et al. (2006) .
States' power or prestige in relation to the rest of the international system is another important concept, often measured using the SNA measure of centrality. This concept rests on the logic that social actors (whether international states, political parties, or legislators) are rarely equal in terms of their material and social power. Some legislators have greater campaign budgets or are otherwise more influential than others (Fowler 2006) ; likewise, some international states are superior in material capabilities or social power to other states (Kinne 2012) . Again, the idea of power inequality among political actors is not new (for an overview, see Ray and Singer 1973) , but it has drawn new attention in the view of the new toolset of measures offered by SNA (e.g., degree centrality).
The goal of this paper is primarily explorative. We seek to evaluate the applicability of SNA measures to the study of political science and, more specifically, to IR research. At first glance, SNA measures seem to offer great advantages: the central SNA assumption of actor non-independence, for example, suggests a natural fit for the study of political processes, which often result from interaction between multiple non-independent actors. Despite this intuitive fit, there has been little research that would take a closer look at the inter-play between network measures and common data issues associated with political science research.
An issue of our potential concern is actor self-selection and endogeneity (non-independence) between actor choices and their outcomes. We examine how the use of network measures, such as S -scores, SEq, or degree centrality as exogenous independent variables may affect the resulting estimates, in the presence of endogeneity between the outcome of interest and the formation of networks, used for the calculation of these measures.
For example, what are the implications of including the alliance-based S score in an equation that predicts trade or conflict? As evident from the debate regarding whether alliances lead to more conflict (Lai and Reiter 2000; Vasquez 2009 ), there may be an overlap between the factors that contribute to conflict initiation and those related to alliance formation. Mathematically, the presence of such an overlap may express itself as a correlation between unobserved factors explaining alliances and the conflict outcome-an issue known as endogeneity. This endogeneity may be further exacerbated by the SNA approach of using the offending variable to construct a measure of network position similarity, such as S or SEq scores that will then be used to predict an outcome that is endogenous to it. Similar examples may be found in other areas of study, such the use of trade-based SEq scores to predict conflict, despite the possible endogeneity between conflict and trade. These measures find uses beyond IR, of course, as scholars of American politics have taken similar approaches to examining the influence of Congressional networks on members' voting patterns (Rogowski and Sinclair 2012) or success in passing legislation and amendments (Fowler 2006) .
Our broader argument is that, despite its obvious advantages, approaches such as SNA that generate such relative position similarity measures remain relatively new to IR and have not yet fully adapted to important methodological issues common to IR research. We point out and offer a simple solution to one such potential issue-the problem of endogeneity between positional similarity and outcomes that it may affect. While the issue of endogeneity has long been recognized in the study of IR (Hegre, Oneal and Russett 2010; Keshk, Pollins and Reuveny 2004; Reuveny and Kang 1996) , it has not yet become salient within the studies using such measures. Rogowski and Sinclair (2012) as an example of addressing network endogeneity within the framework We suggest two approaches for addressing possible endogeneity when employing network based measures as regressors in subsequent analyses, both of which rely on instrumental variables (IV). The first instruments the network itself by modeling a relational variable such as trade and then uses the instrument to construct measures of network similarity or location. The second approach generates an instrument for the network measure. While the recommendation has generally been to take the second approach when applying nonlinear functions to possible endogenous variables (Kelejian 1971), we find a strong bias-variance tradeoff which suggests that for some network measures, such as SEq scores, calculating the network measure from the IV may be preferred in root mean square error terms. We supplement our theoretical argument with Monte Carlo analysis and empirical demonstrations that model (a) the relationship between inter-state alliances and international trade, (b) international trade and conflict networks, and (c) preferential trade agreements(PTA) and economic sanctions, using both naïve and a two-stage instrumental variables estimators.
Our two-stage estimator proceeds by first estimating each state's location in the international system. For example, one might first estimate a standard gravity model of trade to estimate a model of bilateral trade flows. Second, one uses the results of this first stage model to generate predicted values of the locational variable and use these predicted values to construct the appropriate similarity measure. By removing the error terms from the calculation we can eliminate the possible endogeneity between the similarity measure out the outcome of interest. Predicted trade flows are then used to construct a measure of network locational equivalence between pairs of countries. States with similar trading partners will score more similarly on this measure. This instrumented similarity measure is then employed as a predictor variable in the analysis of interest, e.g., international conflict.
Using the endogenous variable to construct a measure of relative positional similarity makes our setup different from standard IV models in which, following Kelejian (1971) , one of legislative studies.
would estimate a linear model of the similarity measure that includes polynomials of the regressors to capture the typically nonlinear relationship between the relational variable and the network measure itself. This standard IV approach produces consistent estimates, but its performance in finite samples may not be best. In contrast, our network measure using an IV may produce biased results in some circumstances (Kelejian 1971) , but it may better capture the variation in the network measure and produce smaller standard errors. The standard IV approach may be less efficient in application to network measures, as network measures often involve complex functions of the endogenous relational variable that may make it hard to identify the correct polynomial from which to directly generate an IV of the measure.
Further, the value of the network measure for each observation usually depends on the realization of the relational variable for many other, and occasionally all other, observations. This means that the IV equation would involve the values of independent variables for other cases as well as interactions between their values across units.
These tradeoffs suggest that the decision about whether to estimate an IV of the network measure or to calculate the network measure using an IV of the relational variable may not be straightforward. To investigate this, we conduct a Monte Carlo analysis for three different interdependence measures: SEq scores, S scores, and centrality. The results indicate, first, that one should almost never ignore the endogeneity problem since doing so results in biased estimates. Comparing our two corrections, we find that, while the IV of the network measure produces estimates with little bias, the network measure of the IV produces sufficient gains in precision to be strongly preferred in root mean square error terms. Further, in some cases the bias in the former can be derived and therefore adjusted for. Specifically, we find that for the use of SEq scores, the SEq of the IV is best in cases with moderate to severe endogeneity. For S scores, we find that the IV of the S score is best in cases with moderate to high endogeneity. Finally, for the use of centrality, our analysis suggests that, in the presence of moderate or high endogeneity, both instrumental approaches are preferable to the naïve model. We illustrate these findings with three empirical demonstrations which produce significantly and substantively different effects for these measures.
Measures of Network Position
Along with a new approach to theorizing, SNA has also equipped scholars with a new set of analytical tools that range from new conceptual measures (e.g., centrality, structural equivalence, connectedness) to network-oriented approaches to statistical estimation.
3 A survey of recent work in political science reveals that centrality or degree centrality is, perhaps, the most commonly used among the network measures (for example, see Fowler 2006; Kinne 2012; Murdie and Davis 2012) . Within the IR subfield, in particular, scholars also commonly employ such network measures as S scores and SEq, both of which intended to measure political similarity among actors in a network. In the current study, we narrow our analysis to the three network measure, which are most commonly used withing political science: centrality, S scores, and structural equivalence.
Centrality
The term "network centrality" or "centrality," for short, refers to a family of network measures, based on the total (sometimes weighted) number of a node's direct and indirect connections (Bonacich 1987) . In many political science applications, actor cenrtrality is used as a measure of actor power or prestige within the network. Bonacich (1987 ), Fowler (2006 ), and Maoz (2010 ; for a practical guide for their calculation, see Miura (2012) . For an overview of network-oriented statistical estimation, see Cranmer and Desmarais (2011) .
4 Although see Bonacich (1987) and Padgett and Ansell (1993) for an argument that actors with low centrality have greater strength within bargaining networks.
Shreve 2013). Scholars of American politics, in the meantime, have used centrality to assess the influence of particular congresspersons (e.g., Fowler 2006) .
Following the general trend in the literature, we focus on the measure of degree centrality:
where V is the set of vertices and A is a |V |x|V | adjacency matrix with A ij entries being equal to 1 if an edge connects vertices i and j, and 0 otherwise.
S Scores
Although IR research has offered several alternative measures of political affinity, it is safe to say that various versions of S scores-a spatial measure of policy similarity-developed by Signorino and Ritter (2002) still constitute the state of the art. 5 The central idea behind the construction of S scores is that one can proxy states' preferences by using the information from their observable (foreign) policy decisions-referred to as "(foreign) policy portfolios"-on a the issues of interest. States with "similar" observable policy decisions will receive similar affinity scores, while states exhibiting a lot of policy divergence will be located further away on the affinity spectrum (Signorino and Ritter 2002, p. 126 
Finally, let W = [p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n ] be a vector of weights.
5 According to Scholar Google, since its introduction in 2002, this measure has been used in 368 scholarly studies. Signorino and Ritter (2002, p. 127 ) define similarity S of states i and j's policy portfolios P i and P j as follows:
where
and
Structural Equivalence Scores
Recent SNA advances led to the development of a series of alternative measures of similarity, such as structural equivalence scores (SEq), employed in Maoz et al. (2006) . Structural equivalence in a network is a measure of similarity of ties going out of i and j to any k and is calculated using the following formula:
where x •i ,x •j are the respective means of i and j's exports to every other state k (row means of the trade matrix X), and x i• ,x i• are the means of the k's exports to i or j (column means) (Maoz et al. 2006, 674) . Note that the first term in the numerator represents the covariance of rows i and j and the second half of the summation represents the column covariance while the first term in the denominator represents the sum of the row and column variances for i and the second the same quantity for j. Thus the structural equivalence measure gives a sense of the similarity, along the lines of a correlation, of two countries outflows and inflows of trade with all other states. In fact, if X is a symmetric matrix, SEq ij is the correlation between X ik and X jk .
Endogeneity of Network Position Measures
Our central argument is that a study of networks' effects is inseparable from the study of network formation. Much like social networks, networks of states rarely form at random-an implicit assumption of using a network measure as an independent variable in a regression.
Instead, both social and international networks emerge in response to two general types of causal effects: homophily-self-selection based on pre-existing similarities-and common exposure (Franzese, Hays and Kachi 2012; Hays, Kachi and Franzese 2010) . The difference between these effects is theoretically important: a theory that posits homophily as the causal mechanism behind network effect must rule out common exposure, and vice versa.
Endogeneity of the independent variable can be thought of as a special type of common exposure, whose effect, if present, is especially detrimental for recovering unbiased estimates.
The literature on alliance formation, for example, has shown that the choice of allies may be driven by short-and long-term security prospects (e.g. This is not to say, however, that the literature has been ignoring endogeneity altogether.
A number of studies have recognized the issue and attempted to test for it by running "reverse causality" checks or lagging the independent variable (e.g., Maoz 2010; Pevehouse 2002a Pevehouse ,b, 2005 . Whether such corrections are sufficient, however, depends on the type and extent of endogeneity (Engle, Hendry and Richard 1983; Granato 1991) . Addressing endogeneity using temporal lags or "reverse causality" may be problematic for several reasons. First, it assumes that a researcher is able to specify the correct lag structure. It is often theoretically unclear how many lags are sufficient to strip the model of endogeneity and defaulting to a one-year lag-the most common fix in the literature-may not be the best solution.
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Second, temporal lags are altogether irrelevant in the presence of feedback loops between the independent and the dependent variables (Engle, Hendry and Richard 1983; Granato 1991 ).
The issue of network endogeneity has been recognized in several recent social science studies (Manski 1993 We demonstrate how to correct for possible network endogeneity using instrumental variable (IV) approaches. We consider two different ways to generate the instrument, which involve generating either an instrument of network measure directly or generating the network variable using an instrument of the endogenous relational variable. In the former we apply standard two equation IV estimation process. We generate a regression equation to model the endogenous network measure and use the instrument in the equation of interest.
Under standard techniques, these equations can be simultaneously estimated to obtain cor- Given this, our alternate approach uses ordinary least squares (OLS) regression estimates to generate an instrument for the endogenous variable and then generates the network measure using the instrument. We then use the instrumented network values in the equation of interest. This approach has the advantage of better accounting for the structure of the network in developing the instrument since the values of the exogenous variables for each unit may be included in a way consistent with the data generating process. It has the disadvantage of producing possibly biased estimates (Goldfeld and Quandt 1968; Kelejian 1971) . In order to obtain correct standard errors, we repeatedly resample the estimated first stage variable, recalculate the network measure, then re-estimate the model and combine the estimates from each draw.
Since the assumptions of either approach will rarely be met, we compare how they each perform across a variety of common network-based measures. We describe the details of our estimation procedures in the next section before moving on to the Monte Carlo analysis.
IV Approaches for Endogeneity in Similarity Measures
Social scientists have long known that the presence of endogeneity leads to biased estimates.
The primary methodological tools of correcting and accounting for endogeneity in social sciences is the use of IV two-stage estimators, such as two-stage least squares (2SLS) (Gawande and Li 2009; Greene 2000) . The main idea is that endogeneity is stripped from the "offending" regressors X by substituting for them a set of "instruments"-exogenous variables that are correlated with X, yet not affected by the dependent variable.
In its simplest form, endogeneity is represented in the following model:
where Y is the dependent variable, X is the independent variable, β is the coefficient on X, and ǫ represents the error term. To say that X is an endogenous regressor simply means that there is a non-zero correlation between X and ǫ. As a result, a random shock to the dependent variable Y leads to a change in X. In order to identify β, we substitute the endogenous regressor X with a set of exogenous regressors Z that predict it:
where Z is uncorrelated with the error terms υ and ǫ, which makes it exogenous to the model.
In our context we need a little more structure to describe endogeneity. Since we construct the potentially endogenous regressor from an observed variable, it is not the regressor itself that may be endogenous but rather the variable from which we create it. Thus we can describe our equation of interest as
where S ij represents the network measure of the location of units i and j based on some relational variable R ij . Note that we have moved to an explicitly dyadic context here since these models generally focus on how two units' relative locations affect a joint outcome between them.
We introduce possible endogeneity through R ij ,
and possible correlation in the joint distribution of the error terms:
Since a proof of bias caused by endogeneity would depend on the precise formula used to calculate a particular network measure, S ij , (and may or may not exist depending on exactly how such a measure is created) we leave that for later and provide illustrations of bias in our Monte Carlo analysis. Of interest will be whether differences across the formulas for the network measures lead to different amounts of bias when the relational variable exhibits endogeneity. First, we outline two distinct approaches to addressing the problem.
Instrumenting the Network Measure
Our first approach follows the standard IV implementation in which we generate an instrument for S ij using a linear regression model. Of course, since we calculate S ij from the relational variable R ij and the possible endogeneity enters through the latter, we do not face the standard IV setup with two linear equations. Rather, our possibly endogenous regressor depends in a nonlinear way on the endogenous variable R ij . We therefore turn to the work of Kelejian (1971) on the inclusion of nonlinear functions of endogenous variables. To paraphrase, the article notes that our Equation 8 may be estimated consistently if we can find an instrument for S ij that is uncorrelated with ǫ ij and linearly independent of X ij .
To generate the instrument, note that we can write the expectation of S ij as a function of the fixed variables Z ij and an unrelated random error. Kelejian (1971) then shows that even though we may not know the exact form of this function we can approximate it with the OLS prediction, S ij , that results from regressing S ij on a polynomial in Z ij of degree d. For large enough d, Z ij and S ij are linearly independent, which results in consistent estimates.
Note that the elements of Z ij may be identical to those of X ij as Kelejian (1971) assumes in his exposition.
The unknown here involves picking a large enough d to insure independence of X ij and the instrument. An additional complication in our setting arises from the fact that S ij often depends on the value of the exogenous variables, Z for units i and j but also on their values for all other units. Most obviously, the calculation of the SEq score for just one pair ij involves the values of R kl for all other pairs kl. Thus the best linear approximation to S ij may depend on polynomials of the values of Z for all units, which may undermine our ability to generate a valid instrument through the IV equation as described above.
Generating the Network Measure from an Instrument
Our second approach parallels the standard IV solution but adds the extra step of generating the appropriate network measure using the instrument. Thus we estimate the regression model corresponding to Equation 9, generate predicted values R ij and construct the network score from these values, which we refer to as S ij ( R ij ) ≡ S ij . We then substitute the instrumented similarity score, S ij , into our estimation of Equation 8:
Two items warrant further discussion at this point. First, because we are using an estimated instrument, our standard errors will tend to be too small. The usual solution is either to estimate the two stages simultaneously or to correct the standard errors after estimation. Given that the first solution is rather involved in the presence of a nonlinear function of the instrumented variable, and also given that our goal is to develop a solution for arbitrary network measures, we utilize a resampling approach. Specifically, we take draws of the estimated distribution of R ij , calculate the resulting network measure S ij ( R ij ), and average across the resulting estimates to obtain correct standard errors according to Little and Rubin's (2002) formula for multiply imputed data.
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Second, the nonlinearity of S ij ( R ij ) means that E[ δ|S ij ( R ij )] = δ may not hold. As Kelejian (1971) proves, this approach will generally produce an inconsistent estimate of δ.
8
Since our instrument removes the error terms in the relational equation and calculates the network measure using the explained portion, we will effectively increase the correlation (and 7 With m estimates of some quantity of interest, Q, denotedq 1 ,q 2 , . . . ,q m , the estimate of Q is just the
(our notation here follows King et al. (2001) ).
8 For example, since SEq scores for i and j with a symmetric relational variable correspond to a correlation between i and j' relationship with each k, the estimated variance will be a function of variances i, j, and their covariance. In the case of an asymmetrical variable, the true variance will take on an even more complicated shape, due to asymmetries in i-k and k-i relationships.
therefore the network measure). Put differently, the correlation between two variables with stochastic errors added is smaller than without it. This change in the scale of S ij will affect the estimated coefficient.
9 In the example just given, the estimate will be smaller than δ in order to preserve the correct marginal effect of S ij . Possible concerns about the effectiveness of the alternate IV approach, however, warrant a comparison between the two methods.
Monte Carlo Analysis
In order to investigate the effects of endogeneity in variables used to create network measures, we performed a Monte Carlo analysis using a data generation process designed to mimic what one might find in a typical political science study. We start by generating information about 100 units. We then create a dyadic version of these data in order to generate relationship data between these units. Next, we use this information to generate network measures based on units' relational data, as well as an outcome variable which depends on those relationships.
In order to investigate the effects of relational endogeneity, we introduce varying amounts of correlation between the relational data and the outcome of interest.
Monte Carlo Setup
More formally, we start with a list of i = 1, 2, . . . , n units with characteristics captured by variables X i and Z i , both of which have a standard normal distribution. We then create a dyadic data set consisting of all pairwise combinations of units, totaling 1000 observations from which we omit the same unit dyads, leading to a final sample size of 900.
To generate interesting network scores, S ij , we place each country in a common space and let the relational variable, R ij , depend on i and j's relative location in this space. Specifically, we evenly space each unit across a ten by ten grid and calculate the Euclidean distance, d ij , between the two units in each dyad. We then generate our relational variable based on the unit-specific characteristics and distance:
where the error terms are i.i.d. standard normal. Including distance in this equation makes it so that units near each other will have common patterns in their values of R ij which will create similarity among nearby pairs and dissimilarity among pairs that are further away. To maintain comparability between variable scales, we normalize the standard deviation of the distance variable to 1. We then use the observed outcomes for R ij to create our similarity measure S ij . Here we consider three such measures: centrality, S scores, and SEq as in Equations 1, 2, and 5.
For each dyad we then calculate the outcome variable of interest as a linear regression equation:
where X 1k indicates the value of variable X 1 for country k in the dyad, S ij represents the network score for units i and j, and d ij represents the Euclidean distance between the two states. The error term is generated from a standard normal. 10 The coefficient on the similarity score changes depending on which one we use since they each have different scales:
for SEq we set δ = −1, for S-scores δ = 2.5, and for centrality δ = −0.2.
In order to ascertain the effects of endogeneity, we then introduce correlation between 10 Note then that distance enters the estimation as an exogenous variable in both the relational and outcome equations. Think, for example, of distance between states affecting both the dyadic trade and the probability of conflict between them. We do this to explore the effect of correlation between the SEq score and another variable in the outcome equation and this leads to bias seepage. the two error terms by drawing them from a bivariate normal distribution:
For now we set the variances equal to one which means that the covariance is equal to the correlation, which we vary from -0.75 to 0.75 by units of 0.25. For each value we generate 500 draws of the error terms, calculate the outcome, relational, and network measures, and then estimate the coefficients in Equation 13 through linear regression.
Finally, in order to correct for the possible endogeneity of S ij we consider both approaches discussed above. First, we generate the scores using an instrument for R ij by estimating Equation 12 via linear regression, calculating the predicted value of R ij , R ij , then constructing the network measures using the instrument (e.g., S ij = SEq( R ij ) and using these instrumented network scores when we run the regression corresponding to Equation 13. We repeat this five times with draws from the estimated distribution of R ij to capture the uncertainty in our instrument. Second, we estimate an instrument for S ij by estimating a linear regression that includes third order polynomials in Z i , Z j ; a third order polynomial in the product of Z i and Z j ; and the products of distance with Z i , Z j , and Z i Z j . 11 We hope to capture the complex dependence of S ij on the exogeneous variables in the equation for R ij .
Examining the results for single draws indicated that adding these variables improved our ability to predict S ij .
Monte Carlo Results
We present the results of our Monte Carlo analysis graphically starting in Figure 1 . The top plot shows the average estimate and a 95% band around it (based on the standard deviation of the sampling distribution) across the 500 draws for each value of ρ while the bottom plot shows the average estimates of the coefficients for X 1i and X 1j . The latter show no bias whatsoever, which is not surprising given that these variables have no correlation with the information in the SEq score, so we focus our discussion on the coefficient for the SEq variable.
[ Figure 1 here.]
The Monte Carlo results show clear evidence of bias. The line denoted with circles represents the naïve, or Uncorrected model, in which the network measures are constructed using the observed relational variable, i.e., S ij (R ij ). The naïve model shows a negative bias with a negative correlation between the error terms in the relational and outcome equations and an upward bias with a positive correlation. The endogeneity appears to create bias by increasing the relational variable while simultaneously increasing the outcome of interest, Y ij . That is, units appear to be more or less similar than they should be, based on the sign of the correlation between the unobserved components of the relational and outcome variables.
The extent of the apparent bias makes it so that the 95% interval does not even include the true value for greater degrees of correlation. Note that a correlation of zero breaks this dependence and results in an unbiased estimate.
The line denoted by triangles shows the results for the network measure constructed from the instrumented value of the relational variable, i.e., S ij ( R ij ), or Score of IV model. This model also shows possible bias. Importantly, though, the difference between the average estimate and the true estimate does not depend on the correlation of the error terms. Thus the IV approach does not appear to suffer from endogeneity bias. Rather, as discussed above this apparent bias reflects the rescaling of the SEq similarity scores. Since the similarity scores will tend to be greater using the instrument, the coefficient estimates in the outcome equation become smaller in order to preserve the correct marginal effect.
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Finally, the line denoted by squares presents the results for the instrumented network measure S ij , or IV or Score model. We see that the model is able to capture the true coefficient spot on, although the confidence interval for this estimate is noticeably larger than that in the previous two models. As foreshadowed by the earlier discussion, when using this approach,the gain in unbiasedness comes at the expense of efficiency.
Next, we evaluate the results for S scores, generated using the same procedure. Overall, these results mirror those for the SEq score, but there some differences emerge. The apparent bias in the coefficient on the S score appears to be less in an absolute sense and also with respect to the variation of the estimates. While the average estimate differs by as much as twenty percent, the 95% central region of the sampling distribution always includes the true value of 0.5. The results for the the Score of IV model again show no dependence on the correlation, but also deviate from the true value by a constant amount. We believe that this result follows from similar logic as for the SEq measure, involving a change in the variation of the underlying variables when calculated using the instrumented rather than the observed relational variable.
The IV of Score model for S Scores is again spot on the true value of the coefficient.
Just like with the SEq estimate, the confidence interval also appears only somewhat larger than that estimated by the Score of IV model, although the difference is not that stark.
The last plot in the first row of Figure 1 presents the analogous results for a model that uses centrality scores. Here, we see again that the estimates of the Uncorrected model exhibit a negative bias for a negative error correlation and a positive bias for a positive error correlation, albeit the 95% confidence interval does capture the true value. The estimates of the both IV models, in the meantime, are effective at correcting the bias and capturing the true values. Unlike in the previous two applications, the confidence intervals produced by the two IV models closely overlap.
The bottom row of Figure 1 reports the estimates for the distance variable. This allows us to determine whether the estimated coefficients for variables in both equations are affected by endogeneity. In the case of the SEq measure, the plot supports our expectation by showing deviations in the average estimate for the coefficient on distance in the Uncorrected model.
The apparent bias in the former represents about twenty percent of the true value and the 95% coverage bounds only overlap the true value when the correlation is near zero. The Score of IV model seems to perform the best, providing an unbiased and efficient estimate of the true coefficient. The IV of Score model captures the true value of the coefficient, yet produces a larger confidence interval. The S score and centrality applications reveal fewer noticeable difference among the three models, with both the estimates and the confidence intervals almost perfectly over-lapping.
Overall, then, our Monte Carlo results show that endogeneity in relational variables used to construct network measures can lead to bias in the estimated coefficient on the network variable and variables that appear in both equations. This apparent bias increases with the absolute value of the correlation between the error terms in the two equations. The deviations may be sufficiently large to wash out the effect of the network measure or even to result in incorrectly signed coefficients. Further, the endogeneity bias can also infect other variables that appear in both equations (and we speculate that it would affect any variable in the outcome equation correlated with variables in the relational equation).
A correction that relies on an instrument for the relational variable appears to produce results that do not reflect bias from the endogeneity. While the coefficient estimates in the Score of IV model do not always reflect the true coefficient, we believe that this merely reflects an expected shift in the scale of the similarity variable caused by removing random variation from the relational variable. The IV of Score correction seems to produce unbiased estimates of the coefficients, yet this gain in unbiasedness often comes at the cost of efficiency.
Just as importantly, either of the IV approaches appear to eliminate bias in the coefficient for variables that appear in both equations.
[ Figure 2 here.]
Empirical Applications
We demonstrate the advantages of the two-stage IV approaches to correcting endogeneity 
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The reverse argument is that, rather than trade reducing conflict, it is conflict that reduces trade due to the "primacy of politics" over economics. According to this argument, firms and investors tend to "follow the flag" and are unwilling to do business in politically hostile to Little and Rubin's (2002) formula for multiply imputed data as described previously.
Trade Instrument
The IV for exports between A and B is constructed based on the gravity model of trade (Hegre 2009; Hegre, Oneal and Russett 2010) . It includes the distance between the two states, as well as their GDP and population. In addition to these components of the gravity model, trade between two states may depend on each state's resource endowment. States rich in such highly desired resources as oil and natural gas, may have larger export volumes of these commodities. The literature also suggests, however, that oil rich states may have lower overall export volumes, as over-reliance on raw commodities may lead to a lack of development in other sectors (Sachs and Warner 2001) . The data on GDP and population is obtained from the Expanded Trade and GDP data (Gleditsch 2002) , while Resource Endowment is measured as natural gas and oil endowment using data collected by Ross (2011) . Unfortunately, economic data often suffers from a large number of missing values and imprecision, especially as one goes farther back temporally. In addition, resource data is unavailable prior to 1960 and after 1999. Therefore, we limit our analysis to 1960-1999. Finally, we log all variables to control for skewness. We add .001 to the trade variable in order to maintain as many observations as possible. Since every observation is used to calculate the similarity scores, losing even a small number of observations is problematic.
The results of the model used to create the instrument are presented in The function that we wrote to calculate the similarity score replaces missing entries with zeros since missing even one element of a row or column makes the entire SEq calculation impossible.
logged predicted values, then reshape the dyadic data into an n × n matrix, whose ij cell entries represent the predicted export values divided by GDP, and whose diagonal entries are
. Finally, we use the resulting matrix to calculate the Export SEq or Trade SEq, using the formula in Equation (5).
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[ Table 1 here.]
The Conflict Equation
The values of the dependent variable in the second stage-conflict-are coded as 1 if i and j experienced a military interstate dispute (MID) in a given year, and 0 otherwise. The estimation sample includes the total of 166 states between 1960-1999.
Following Maoz et al. (2006) , in addition to Trade SEq, we regress the MID variable on Distance, Capability Ratio, Minimum Regime Score, Alliance SEq, IGO SEq, and temporal splines. Alliance SEq and IGO SEq are calculated analogously to the Trade SEq variable, albeit without our correction for endogeneity.
16 For spatial considerations, we refer the reader to Maoz et al. (2006) for detailed information on the coding and data sources for these variables. Table 2 presents the results of our replication. Our replication of Maoz et al's (2006) original model-or the naïve model-is presented first. We were able to replicate the results of Maoz et al's (2006) 15 Note that our results are identical to the ones that would be obtained by plugging our predicted values matrix into The Maoz Network Program. Despite closely following the procedure outlined in Maoz et al (2006) , we were only able to achieve a correlation of 0.6 between our replicated Trade SEq scores and those contained in the replication files provided by the authors. We believe this disparity comes from the differences in the samples used to construct the scores, i.e. SEq scores seem to be sensitive to such decisions as whether to listwise delete the observations with missing data before or after constructing SEq scores. As a result, the only way to produce the exact Trade SEq scores as the ones provided in Maoz et al's (2006) replication data is to calculate them on the exact same sample of countries as initially used by the authors. This disparity, however, does not affect our ability to exactly replicate Maoz et al's (2006) results both in direction and significance of the coefficients.
16 We choose to ignore the possible endogeneity between Alliance SEq and IGO SEq, for the sake of isolating the effect of correcting the endogeneity in the Trade SEq variable.
in terms of direction and significance of all coefficients.
17 Model 2 of Table 2 presents the results of the first IV approach-predicting trade and using the predicted values to calculate
Trade SEq scores (Trade IV model). Finally, Model 3 of Table 2 displays the results of the second instrumental approach-using a set of regressors to predict the Trade SEq scores themselves (SEq of IV model). We can see that, despite some similarities, the results of the naïve and the two corrected models also show some major differences.
[ Table 2 here.] SEq of IV model, in the meantime, seems to produce a slight upward bias, independent of 17 Note that, since the available data for constructing the instrumental variable restricts our analysis to 1960-1999, which explains slight differences in the actual coefficient values. the error correlation. Finally, the IV of SEq model is virtually unbiased, yet produces much larger standard errors.
Given these findings, the pattern of results presented in Table 2 could Given our inability to observe or measure the actual error correlation between conflict and trade, the above pattern of results still fails to give us a definitive answer as to the true relationship between conflict and trade. The broad take-away point, however, is that the use of SEq scores in the presence of high error correlation may result in substantive bias in the estimates. The suggested IV models may help diagnose such error correlation and make the necessary adjustments in the interpretation and use of the results.
S Scores: Alliance-Trade Endogeneity
Our second example draws on the work by Long (2008) , who argues that bilateral trade decreases in anticipation of conflict, as looming conflict is an indication of an upcoming spike in the costs of transportation, transaction, and production. Long's theoretical model includes a set of additional covariates of bilateral trade, including the strength of diplomatic ties. Arguing that states with good diplomatic relations may engage in greater levels of trade, Long (2008) includes this effect in the empirical model, operationalizing diplomatic relations as dyad-specific weighted S scores of alliance portfolios. A possible issue here is that state A's choice of trade partners may be nonindependent from its alliance commitments: relative security concerns, for example, may dictate that states trade within rather than outside of their security alliances (Gowa 1995) . As a result, there may be an error correlation between bilateral alliances-the variable used to construct S scores-and A-B bilateral trade-the dependent variable. We explore this issue by re-estimating the empirical analysis of Long (2008) using the two IV approaches proposed above.
The first approach-S score of IV-is to construct predicted values R ij for A-B bilateral alliance using a linear regression, and then use these predicted values instead of the observed values of alliances, R ij , to construct weighted Alliance S scores, S ij , which we will plug into the outcome equation of trade, Y ij . The second approach-IV of S score-is to construct an instrument of the S score itself to subsequently use in the outcome equation of trade, Y ij .
Alliance Instrument
Along with most of the IR literature, Long (2008) obtains the data on weighted S scores from the EUGene program (Bennett and Stam 2000) . Generating predicted S scores to replicate Long (2008) , therefore, requires that we also follow the same procedure of calculating S scores as EUGene's data. These S scores are based on the Alliance Type variable, obtained from the Alliance Treaties Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) dataset (Leeds et al. 2002) and state Capability Index variable from the Correlates of War (COW) dataset (Singer 1987 ).
The Alliance Type variable is treated as an ordinal measure, with the value of 0 representing the absence of an alliance, 1 representing an entente, 2-a neutrality pact, and 3-a defense pact between states A and B in a given year (Signorino and Ritter 2002) . Self-dyads of the type i − i are commonly assigned the value of 3 (Sweeney and Keshk 2005) , following the logic that a state will defend itself if attacked (Bueno de Mesquita 1975) .
To construct the instrument, we regress this variable on a set of regressors associated with alliance formation, relying on the alliance formation equation from Long, Nordstrom and Baek (2007) to help identify relevant covariates. The results of the model used to create the instrument are presented in Table 3 . The model shows that stronger alliance commitments are found between states of similar regime type as well as strategic rivals and states with a greater number of total allies. The strength of alliance commitments is negatively affected by Distance, Major Power status and External Threat.
[ Table 3 here.]
Next, we utilize the predicted values to generate the S score instrument using Equation 2 to use in the trade equation. Consistent, with Long (2008) , we weigh predicted alliance portfolios by Side B material capabilities, obtained from the Correlates of War (COW) dataset (Singer 1987 ).
Despite the difference, the raw and the corrected measures still have a rather high correlation of r = 0.45. Mimicking Long (2008) , we proceed to log our instrumented S scores before using them as a regressor in the trade equation.
Trade Equation
Next, we re-estimate Long (2008) using the author's replication data. The side-by-side results of the naïve and the corrected models are presented in Table 4 . Model 1 (Alliance IV) displays the results of the naïve model, Model 2 presents the results of the model, in which we first create an instrument of Alliance, use this instrument to calculate the corrected S scores, and substitute these S scores in the original equation. The third model (S Score IV) displays the results of the model, in which we substitute the uncorrected S scores themselves with an instrument.
The side-by-side comparison of results reveals several indications of endogeneity and associated bias in the naïve model. First, note the difference between the coefficients on the estimated and naïve S score variable: insignificant in the naïve model, this coefficient is both significant and substantially larger in absolute value in both of the corrected models, albeit the coefficient in the Alliance IV model is the smallest in value (−13.197 compared to −1.94 in the S Score IV model). Unlike the naïve model, both of the corrected models suggest some evidence of a negative relationship between similarity of alliance portfolios and trade.
We can further explore these results, in the view of the findings from our Monte Carlo analysis. In particular, the Monte Carlo analysis showed that the results of the naïve model may diverge from those of the two IV models, in the presence of strong endogeneity between the relational variable and the outcome variable. Strong negative error correlation leads to positive bias in the coefficient on S scores, while strong negative correlation leads to a negative bias. We also demonstrated that the S Score of IV Model will be characterized by downward bias in the S Score coefficient, while the IV of S Score will produce a coefficient that is both unbiased and efficient.
Judging from the patterns of results presented in Table 4 , we may then suspect a positive error correlation between alliance and trade, i.e., states that have a lot of over-lap in their allies also engage in more trade. More broadly, the divergence in results between the three models indicates endogeneity between the relational and the outcome variables. Just like with the SEq score, our recommendation is to explore rather than ignore the issue by estimating one of both of the IV models we suggest. Such additional analysis will serve as a robustness check for the main results and allow for uncovering possible endogeneity.
[ Table 4 here.] Centrality: PTA-Sanctions Endogeneity Our final empirical application is a replication of Hafner-Burton and Montgomery (2008), who demonstrate that a states with high centrality in the PTA network are most likely to issue economic sanctions. In this example, we would like to draw attention to the possible nonrandom formation of the PTA network and its possible endogeneity with respect to sanctioning behavior. Imposing economic sanctions is a form of conflictual behavior, albeit of lower level that a military dispute. Conflictual behavior between two states may affect their trade relationship, such as whether they sign a PTA. Just like with previous empirical applications, we proceed in two stages. First, we use a set of regressors to predict whether two states are likely to be part of a PTA, which allows us to construct predicted values R ij for A-B number of shared PTA memberships. We then use these predicted values to construct centrality scores for each state in the system, which we proceed to use instead of the "uncorrected" centrality scores in Hafner-Burton and Montgomery (2008) Next, states might be more likely to enter in a PTA if they already share alliance ties.
We capture this by including an indicator variable, Allies that captures whether the two states are part to an alliance. We may also suspect that states may be more likely to enter a PTA if the majorities of their populations speak the same language. We control for this by including a binary indicator Same Language. We also know that democratic states tend to engage in more trade than dyads made up of autocracies or mixed in terms of regime types (Hegre, Oneal and Russett 2010) . We account for this by including an indicator variable that captures Joint Democracy. Finally, two states may be more likely to form a PTA if they already view each other as major trade partners. We account for this by including a lagged value of bilateral trade. The resulting model is presented in Table 5 [ Table 5 here.]
Economic Sanctions Model
Next, we employ the predicted values to generate the centrality score instrument using [ Table 6 here.] Again, it is useful to explore these divergent model results in the view of our Monte Carlo analysis. The Monte Carlo analysis have demonstrated that, for centrality scores, the naïve model will produce an inflated coefficient on the centrality variable, in the presence of high positive error correlation between the relational and the outcome variables (in the particular example, between joint PTA memberships and sanctions). Analogously, a negative error correlation may result in a downwardly biased coefficient on the centrality variable. Both of the IV models, on the other hand, produce virtually unbiased estimates.
The pattern of results in Table 6 , then suggests that there may be a negative error correlation between joint PTA membership and economic sanctions (i.e, states are less likely to form PTAs with potential targets of their sanctions). This would explain the difference in magnitude between the coefficient on the centrality scores in the naïve and the corrected models. A failure to explore possible endogeneity may lead to biased estimates of even incorrect inferences.
Conclusion
We argue that the issue of endogeneity-or the dependence between network position and effect-is especially relevant to a wide array of empirical analyses. This issue, however, can be addressed with either of two relatively straightforward adaptation of an IV two-stage estimation approach. Monte Carlo results show s strong bias-variance tradeoff between the two approaches as well as demonstrating the the empirical consequences of ignoring bias may be substantial. Our empirical examples illustrate that these results carry over to real world data.
There are a number of future investigations that our current results point towards. First, more detail on the nature of the bias introduced by using raw similarity scores rather than corrected scores would be valuable. While this would need to be done on a case by case basis, some cases are sufficiently ubiquitous to warrant such results. Second, as with any IV approach, the quality of of our estimates depends directly upon the quality of the instrument.
Exploring how variation in the ability of researchers to properly explain the relational variable should also be of interest. This will more generally lead to a root mean squared error comparison of the instrumented versus raw similarity measure. Third, an extension for discrete network connections would be worth exploring. Alternate approaches for network measures that assume binary connections would be needed since the instrument used to calculate the measure would be continuous, perhaps requiring weighting by the probability of a connection. Finally, it would be helpful to explore the consequences of endogeneity through additional Monte Carlo work. For instance, our results appear to show some bias for S scores, but that bias also appears to be small relative to the precision of the estimates, especially in comparison to the results for SEq scores. Whether that results from our particular setup or suggests a general greater robustness of S scores is worthy of further investigation.
Note that our analysis includes correlation only between the error terms for each unit in the relational and outcome equations. Beyond that we assume independent and identically distributed errors in the two equations. Certainly many situations may not meet this assumption; once we introduce correlation between errors within equations, the effects of endogeneity could change dramatically since the similarity score calculation could then include many elements correlated with the outcome of interest. Given the frequency of crosssectional time-series applications of similarity scores, exploring the possible consequences of autocorrelation in the relational measures could also be worthwhile.
Beyond the direct implications for the SNA research, our results raise more general questions about the calculation of network-level measures in the presence of endogeneity.
Besides those examined here, other examples include measures of network polarity, economic interdependence, or spatial-lag models. Since the endogeneity varies across actors, bias in coefficients may be added or even multiplied in the process of calculation of such measures.
At a minimum, our results call for a further investigation of the effects of endogeneity on these scores' use as independent variables. Notes: Uncorrected models use the observed value of R ij to calculate the similarity score, S ij (R ij ). Score of instrumental variable models uses an estimate of R ij from a linear regression to generate S ij ( R ij ). Instrumental variable of score models runs an IV regression that models S ij (R ij ) with a linear regression (see text for details). Results based on 500 draws for each value of ρ. Confidence interval calculated using the standard deviation of the sampling distribution of the coefficient estimates. True values indicated by darker red lines. Notes: Uncorrected models use the observed value of R ij to calculate the similarity score, S ij (R ij ). Score of instrumental variable models uses an estimate of R ij from a linear regression to generate S ij ( R ij ). Instrumental variable of score models runs an IV regression that models S ij (R ij ) with a linear regression (see text for details). Results based on 500 draws for each value of ρ. Confidence interval calculated using the standard deviation of the sampling distribution of the coefficient estimates. True values indicated by darker red lines. Maoz et al. 2006 Maoz et al. replication data (1960 Maoz et al. -1999 , politically relevant dyads). 
